#### Structure or Noise?

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# Why We Must Model I

Nature spontaneously organizes
Emergent structures



Why We Must Model 2 Engineered systems also spontaneously organize Internet route flapping Power-law Internet organization Fínancíal markets crash Power grids fail spectacularly Social pattern formation on the web

...

# Consequence

· Each needs its own explanatory (function) basis

Problem:

Emergent structures not given directly by the system coordinates or the governing equations of motion

# Why we must Model 3

• Fundamental Mathematics: Intrinsic Randomness Nonlínear dynamical systems [Kolmogorov 1958]: • Chaotic systems: Shannon entropy  $h_{\mu} > 0$  Kolmogorov-Chaitin [1963] complexity of Data: Size of shortest Turing Machine Program to predict Data KC complexity = Shannon entropy [Brudno 1978] :

 $|Program| \propto e^{h_{\mu}|Data|}$ 

# Exponential Increase in Prediction ResourcesAccuracy $\propto e^{-T}$ |Measurements| $\propto e^{T}$ |Compute time| $\propto e^{T}$



# Consequence

#### No short cuts!

- No closed-form solutions
- No computational speed-ups
- Must compute full trajectory

 Right representation is critical for reducing the prediction error as far as possible (but no farther!)

#### Past:

Fundamental in Nonlinear Dynamics! • Each nonlinear system requires its own representation Selecting balance between ascribing structure or noise to a measurement depends on representation Fundamental issue: Theory building Subsidiary issue: Statistical fluctuations due to finite data sample

#### Future: Fundamental in Designing Multiagent Systems



## The Feedback Loop



#### Knowledge + Action

 A central challenge:
 Actions change the world and so

 its statistics,
 and
 what is knowable.

## Approaches

 Modeling: Statistical inference Strategizing: • Game theory Adapting: Reinforcement learning • Group behavior: Population dynamics (evolution & ecology)

## Approaches: Sticking points

- Modeling:
  - Statistical inference: static, batch mode
- Strategizing:
  - Game theory: equilibria, no transients
- Adapting:
- Reinforcement learning: a priori design, brittle
  Group behavior:
  - Population dynamics (evolution & ecology): individuals have no structure (don't learn)
- Where are the basic principles?

Interactive Learning (Susanne Still, Chris Ellison, & JPC) Problem: Experiment to Learn World Model • The world behaves:  $X = X = X_{\text{past future}} X$ • Agent learns model of the world: States R • Agent take actions A Those actions affect the world Now the world is different! How to close the feedback loop?

arxiv.org: 0708.0654 [physics.gen-ph] & 0708.1580 [cs.IT]

Passively Learning a Model Pattern discovery: • Learn the world's hidden states  $\Pr(\mathcal{R} \mid X)$  Causal shielding:  $\Pr(\stackrel{\leftarrow}{X} \stackrel{\rightarrow}{X}) = \Pr(\stackrel{\leftarrow}{X} | \mathcal{R}) \Pr(\stackrel{\rightarrow}{X} | \mathcal{R})$  $\blacklozenge$  Search in the space of models:  $\mathcal{R} \in \mathcal{M}$  Objective function  $\min_{\Pr(\mathcal{R}|\tilde{X})} \left( I[\tilde{X};\mathcal{R}] + \beta I[\tilde{X};\tilde{X}|\mathcal{R}] \right)$  $\beta \sim 1/T$ Model: Map from Info states contaín Reduce info history about histories has about future histories to states

$$E(\mathcal{R}, \overleftarrow{X}) = \mathcal{D}\left(\Pr(\overrightarrow{X} \mid \overleftarrow{X}) || \Pr(\overrightarrow{X} \mid \mathcal{R})\right)$$
  

$$\Pr(\overrightarrow{X} \mid \mathcal{R}) = \frac{1}{\Pr(\mathcal{R})} \sum_{\overleftarrow{X}} \Pr(\overrightarrow{X} \mid \overleftarrow{X}) \Pr(\mathcal{R} \mid \overleftarrow{X}) \Pr(\overleftarrow{X})$$
  

$$\Pr(\mathcal{R}) = \sum_{\overleftarrow{X}} \Pr(\mathcal{R} \mid \overleftarrow{X}) \Pr(\overleftarrow{X})$$



What Do Solutions Mean? Causal Models • Causal architecture given by  $\epsilon$ -Machine M: • Optimal predictor:  $h_{\mu}(M) \le h_{\mu}(\mathcal{R})$ • Minimal size (within optimal predictors  $\widehat{\mathcal{R}}$ ):  $C_{\mu}(M) \le C_{\mu}(\widehat{\mathcal{R}})$ Unique (within min, opt predictors)

JPC & K. Young, Inferring Statistical Complexity, Physical Review Letters 63 (1989) 105-108. C. R. Shalizi & JPC, Journal Statistical Physics 104 (2001) 817-879.

## Passívely Learning a Model

• Theorem: Low-temperature limit  $\beta \to \infty$ Recover  $\epsilon$ -Machine:  $R_{\beta} \to M$ 

Conclusion: Best causal approximates.



#### Passívely Learning a Model

Optimal balance structure & error At each level  $\beta$  of approximation

In practice: Learn an oo-state world (SNS: simple nondeterminstic source)



#### Interactive Learning

 Decision: Using model, take actions • Policy:  $Pr(\mathcal{A} | \overleftarrow{X})$  (or from  $\mathcal{R}$ ) Experimentation objective function

Model: Map from histories to states Policy: Map from histories to actions

 $\max_{\Pr(\mathcal{R}|\tilde{X}),\Pr(\mathcal{A}|\tilde{X})} \left( I[\{\mathcal{R},\mathcal{A}\};\tilde{X}] - \lambda I[\mathcal{R};\tilde{X}] - \mu I[\mathcal{A};\tilde{X}] \right)$ 

Info states/actions contain about futures Info states contain about histories

Info actions contain about histories

#### Interactive Learning: Results

 Optimal model: Recover causal architecture Optimal policies Causally equivalent policies • Curiosity: Take informative actions Control: Make world easier to model Balance of exploitation and control arxiv.org: 0708.0654 [physics.gen-ph] & 0708.1580[cs.IT]

#### Connections

Note iLearning subsumes:
Causal modeling
Game theory
Equilibrium economics
Reinforcement learning

#### Knowledge + Action

- Deviation from knowledge:
  - Model evaluation (e.g., prediction error)
- Valuation: Commitment of resources to action
  - Policy evaluation (e.g., average reward)
- How? Augment objective function
  - Change relative weighting of Lagrange multipliers:  $\lambda$  &  $\mu$
  - Add new terms: e.g., ...
- Examples:
  - "Science": Need accurate knowledge, at expense of producing it
  - "Politics": Need world to behave, independent of knowledge or cost
  - These are positions on causal rate-distortion curve

## The Feedback Loop



# Main message

 Closing the loop: How interaction changes the world & how one adapts to those changes
 Theoretical foundations (& algorithms) for closing the feedback loop are now available.

Conclusion Basic principles follow from Information theory (rate distortion) Statistical physics Balance exploitation & exploration • Balance structure & error Balance exploitation & control Challenge: Fold in risk

# Prospects

 Collective Cognition: Pattern discovery Interactive learning Adaptation dynamics Emergent policy design Multiagent dynamical systems



